The New Yorker MAG published this on our impending ATTACK ON IRAN!
I BELIEVE THAT SEYMOUR HERSH was a capitalist tool, i.e. he dropped
hints US was going to do this to IRAN to knock the PERSIANS into line
SEE more recent:

Annals of National Security : Shifting Targets
(The Administration’s plan for Iran.) (yeah, right)

by Seymour M. Hersh October 8, 2007

In a series of public statements in recent months, President Bush and
members of his Administration have redefined the war in Iraq, to an
increasing degree, as a strategic battle between the United States and
Iran. “Shia extremists, backed by Iran, are training Iraqis to carry out
attacks on our forces and the Iraqi people,” Bush told the national
convention of the American Legion in August. “The attacks on our bases
and our troops by Iranian-supplied munitions have increased. . . . The
Iranian regime must halt these actions. And, until it does, I will take
actions necessary to protect our troops.” He then concluded, to
applause, “I have authorized our military commanders in Iraq to confront
Tehran’s murderous activities.”

The President’s position, and its corollary—that, if many of America’s
problems in Iraq are the responsibility of Tehran, then the solution to
them is to confront the Iranians—have taken firm hold in the
Administration. This summer, the White House, pushed by the office of
Vice-President Dick Cheney, requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
redraw long-standing plans for a possible attack on Iran, according to
former officials and government consultants. The focus of the plans had
been a broad bombing attack, with targets including Iran’s known and
suspected nuclear facilities and other military and infrastructure
sites. Now the emphasis is on “surgical” strikes on Revolutionary Guard
Corps facilities in Tehran and elsewhere, which, the Administration
claims, have been the source of attacks on Americans in Iraq. What had
been presented primarily as a counter-proliferation mission has been
reconceived as counterterrorism.

The shift in targeting reflects three developments. First, the President
and his senior advisers have concluded that their campaign to convince
the American public that Iran poses an imminent nuclear threat has
failed (unlike a similar campaign before the Iraq war), and that as a
result there is not enough popular support for a major bombing campaign.
The second development is that the White House has come to terms, in
private, with the general consensus of the American intelligence
community that Iran is at least five years away from obtaining a bomb.
And, finally, there has been a growing recognition in Washington and
throughout the Middle East that Iran is emerging as the geopolitical
winner of the war in Iraq.

During a secure videoconference that took place early this summer, the
President told Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, that he was
thinking of hitting Iranian targets across the border and that the
British “were on board.” At that point, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice interjected that there was a need to proceed carefully, because of
the ongoing diplomatic track. Bush ended by instructing Crocker to tell
Iran to stop interfering in Iraq or it would face American retribution.

At a White House meeting with Cheney this summer, according to a former
senior intelligence official, it was agreed that, if limited strikes on
Iran were carried out, the Administration could fend off criticism by
arguing that they were a defensive action to save soldiers in Iraq. If
Democrats objected, the Administration could say, “Bill Clinton did the
same thing; he conducted limited strikes in Afghanistan, the Sudan, and
in Baghdad to protect American lives.” The former intelligence official
added, “There is a desperate effort by Cheney et al. to bring military
action to Iran as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the politicians are
saying, ‘You can’t do it, because every Republican is going to be
defeated, and we’re only one fact from going over the cliff in Iraq.’
But Cheney doesn’t give a rat’s ass about the Republican worries, and
neither does the President.”

Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman, said, “The President has made it
clear that the United States government remains committed to a
diplomatic solution with respect to Iran. The State Department is
working diligently along with the international community to address our
broad range of concerns.” (The White House declined to comment.)

I was repeatedly cautioned, in interviews, that the President has yet to
issue the “execute order” that would be required for a military
operation inside Iran, and such an order may never be issued. But there
has been a significant increase in the tempo of attack planning. In
mid-August, senior officials told reporters that the Administration
intended to declare Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps a foreign terrorist
organization. And two former senior officials of the C.I.A. told me
that, by late summer, the agency had increased the size and the
authority of the Iranian Operations Group. (A spokesman for the agency
said, “The C.I.A. does not, as a rule, publicly discuss the relative
size of its operational components.”)

“They’re moving everybody to the Iran desk,” one recently retired C.I.A.
official said. “They’re dragging in a lot of analysts and ramping up
everything. It’s just like the fall of 2002”—the months before the
invasion of Iraq, when the Iraqi Operations Group became the most
important in the agency. He added, “The guys now running the Iranian
program have limited direct experience with Iran. In the event of an
attack, how will the Iranians react? They will react, and the
Administration has not thought it all the way through.”

That theme was echoed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former
national-security adviser, who said that he had heard discussions of the
White House’s more limited bombing plans for Iran. Brzezinski said that
Iran would likely react to an American attack “by intensifying the
conflict in Iraq and also in Afghanistan, their neighbors, and that
could draw in Pakistan. We will be stuck in a regional war for twenty

In a speech at the United Nations last week, Iran’s President, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, was defiant. He referred to America as an “aggressor”
state, and said, “How can the incompetents who cannot even manage and
control themselves rule humanity and arrange its affairs? Unfortunately,
they have put themselves in the position of God.” (The day before, at
Columbia, he suggested that the facts of the Holocaust still needed to
be determined.)

“A lot depends on how stupid the Iranians will be,” Brzezinski told me.
“Will they cool off Ahmadinejad and tone down their language?” The Bush
Administration, by charging that Iran was interfering in Iraq, was
aiming “to paint it as ‘We’re responding to what is an intolerable
situation,’ ” Brzezinski said. “This time, unlike the attack in Iraq,
we’re going to play the victim. The name of our game seems to be to get
the Iranians to overplay their hand.”

General David Petraeus, the commander of the multinational forces in Iraq,
in his report to Congress in September, buttressed the Administration’s
case against Iran. “None of us, earlier this year, appreciated the extent
of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq’s leaders
all now have greater concern,” he said. Iran, Petraeus said, was fighting
“a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.”

Iran has had a presence in Iraq for decades; the extent and the purpose of
its current activities there are in dispute, however. During Saddam
Hussein’s rule, when the Sunni-dominated Baath Party brutally oppressed the
majority Shiites, Iran supported them. Many in the present Iraqi Shiite
leadership, including prominent members of the government of Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki, spent years in exile in Iran; last week, at the Council on
Foreign Relations, Maliki said, according to the Washington Post, that
Iraq’s relations with the Iranians had “improved to the point that they are
not interfering in our internal affairs.” Iran is so entrenched in Iraqi
Shiite circles that any “proxy war” could be as much through the Iraqi
state as against it. The crux of the Bush Administration’s strategic
dilemma is that its decision to back a Shiite-led government after the fall
of Saddam has empowered Iran, and made it impossible to exclude Iran from
the Iraqi political scene.

Vali Nasr, a professor of international politics at Tufts University, who
is an expert on Iran and Shiism, told me, “Between 2003 and 2006, the
Iranians thought they were closest to the United States on the issue of
Iraq.” The Iraqi Shia religious leadership encouraged Shiites to avoid
confrontation with American soldiers and to participate in
elections—believing that a one-man, one-vote election process could only
result in a Shia-dominated government. Initially, the insurgency was mainly
Sunni, especially Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Nasr told me that Iran’s policy
since 2003 has been to provide funding, arms, and aid to several Shiite
factions—including some in Maliki’s coalition. The problem, Nasr said, is
that “once you put the arms on the ground you cannot control how they’re
used later.”

In the Shiite view, the White House “only looks at Iran’s ties to Iraq in
terms of security,” Nasr said. “Last year, over one million Iranians
travelled to Iraq on pilgrimages, and there is more than a billion dollars
a year in trading between the two countries. But the Americans act as if
every Iranian inside Iraq were there to import weapons.”

Many of those who support the President’s policy argue that Iran poses an
imminent threat. In a recent essay in Commentary, Norman Podhoretz depicted
President Ahmadinejad as a revolutionary, “like Hitler . . . whose
objective is to overturn the going international system and to replace it .
. . with a new order dominated by Iran. . . . [T]he plain and brutal truth
is that if Iran is to be prevented from developing a nuclear arsenal, there
is no alternative to the actual use of military force.” Podhoretz
concluded, “I pray with all my heart” that President Bush “will find it
possible to take the only action that can stop Iran from following through
on its evil intentions both toward us and toward Israel.” Podhoretz
recently told that he had met with the President for about
forty-five minutes to urge him to take military action against Iran, and
believed that “Bush is going to hit” Iran before leaving office.
(Podhoretz, one of the founders of neoconservatism, is a strong backer of
Rudolph Giuliani’s Presidential campaign, and his son-in-law, Elliott
Abrams, is a senior adviser to President Bush on national security.)

In early August, Army Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, the
second-ranking U.S. commander in Iraq, told the Times about an increase in
attacks involving explosively formed penetrators, a type of lethal bomb
that discharges a semi-molten copper slug that can rip through the armor of
Humvees. The Times reported that U.S. intelligence and technical analyses
indicated that Shiite militias had obtained the bombs from Iran. Odierno
said that Iranians had been “surging support” over the past three or four

Questions remain, however, about the provenance of weapons in Iraq,
especially given the rampant black market in arms. David Kay, a former
C.I.A. adviser and the chief weapons inspector in Iraq for the United
Nations, told me that his inspection team was astonished, in the aftermath
of both Iraq wars, by “the huge amounts of arms” it found circulating among
civilians and military personnel throughout the country. He recalled seeing
stockpiles of explosively formed penetrators, as well as charges that had
been recovered from unexploded American cluster bombs. Arms had also been
supplied years ago by the Iranians to their Shiite allies in southern Iraq
who had been persecuted by the Baath Party.

“I thought Petraeus went way beyond what Iran is doing inside Iraq today,”
Kay said. “When the White House started its anti-Iran campaign, six months
ago, I thought it was all craziness. Now it does look like there is some
selective smuggling by Iran, but much of it has been in response to
American pressure and American threats—more a ‘shot across the bow’ sort of
thing, to let Washington know that it was not going to get away with its
threats so freely. Iran is not giving the Iraqis the good stuff—the
anti-aircraft missiles that can shoot down American planes and its advanced
anti-tank weapons.”

Another element of the Administration’s case against Iran is the presence
of Iranian agents in Iraq. General Petraeus, testifying before Congress,
said that a commando faction of the Revolutionary Guards was seeking to
turn its allies inside Iraq into a “Hezbollah-like force to serve its
interests.” In August, Army Major General Rick Lynch, the commander of the
3rd Infantry Division, told reporters in Baghdad that his troops were
tracking some fifty Iranian men sent by the Revolutionary Guards who were
training Shiite insurgents south of Baghdad. “We know they’re here and we
target them as well,” he said.

Patrick Clawson, an expert on Iran at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, told me that “there are a lot of Iranians at any time inside
Iraq, including those doing intelligence work and those doing humanitarian
missions. It would be prudent for the Administration to produce more
evidence of direct military training—or produce fighters captured in Iraq
who had been trained in Iran.” He added, “It will be important for the
Iraqi government to be able to state that they were unaware of this
activity”; otherwise, given the intense relationship between the Iraqi
Shiite leadership and Tehran, the Iranians could say that “they had been
asked by the Iraqi government to train these people.” (In late August,
American troops raided a Baghdad hotel and arrested a group of Iranians.
They were a delegation from Iran’s energy ministry, and had been invited to
Iraq by the Maliki government; they were later released.)

“If you want to attack, you have to prepare the groundwork, and you have to
be prepared to show the evidence,” Clawson said. Adding to the complexity,
he said, is a question that seems almost counterintuitive: “What is the
attitude of Iraq going to be if we hit Iran? Such an attack could put a
strain on the Iraqi government.”

A senior European diplomat, who works closely with American intelligence,
told me that there is evidence that Iran has been making extensive
preparation for an American bombing attack. “We know that the Iranians are
strengthening their air-defense capabilities,” he said, “and we believe
they will react asymmetrically—hitting targets in Europe and in Latin
America.” There is also specific intelligence suggesting that Iran will be
aided in these attacks by Hezbollah. “Hezbollah is capable, and they can do
it,” the diplomat said.

In interviews with current and former officials, there were repeated
complaints about the paucity of reliable information. A former high-level
C.I.A. official said that the intelligence about who is doing what inside
Iran “is so thin that nobody even wants his name on it. This is the

The difficulty of determining who is responsible for the chaos in Iraq can
be seen in Basra, in the Shiite south, where British forces had earlier
presided over a relatively secure area. Over the course of this year,
however, the region became increasingly ungovernable, and by fall the
British had retreated to fixed bases. A European official who has access to
current intelligence told me that “there is a firm belief inside the
American and U.K. intelligence community that Iran is supporting many of
the groups in southern Iraq that are responsible for the deaths of British
and American soldiers. Weapons and money are getting in from Iran. They
have been able to penetrate many groups”—primarily the Mahdi Army and other
Shiite militias.

A June, 2007, report by the International Crisis Group found, however, that
Basra’s renewed instability was mainly the result of “the systematic abuse
of official institutions, political assassinations, tribal vendettas,
neighborhood vigilantism and enforcement of social mores, together with the
rise of criminal mafias.” The report added that leading Iraqi politicians
and officials “routinely invoke the threat of outside interference”—from
bordering Iran—“to justify their behavior or evade responsibility for their

Earlier this year, before the surge in U.S. troops, the American command in
Baghdad changed what had been a confrontational policy in western Iraq, the
Sunni heartland (and the base of the Baathist regime), and began working
with the Sunni tribes, including some tied to the insurgency. Tribal
leaders are now getting combat support as well as money, intelligence, and
arms, ostensibly to fight Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Empowering Sunni forces
may undermine efforts toward national reconciliation, however. Already,
tens of thousands of Shiites have fled Anbar Province, many to Shiite
neighborhoods in Baghdad, while Sunnis have been forced from their homes in
Shiite communities. Vali Nasr, of Tufts, called the internal displacement
of communities in Iraq a form of “ethnic cleansing.”

“The American policy of supporting the Sunnis in western Iraq is making the
Shia leadership very nervous,” Nasr said. “The White House makes it seem as
if the Shia were afraid only of Al Qaeda—but they are afraid of the Sunni
tribesmen we are arming. The Shia attitude is ‘So what if you’re getting
rid of Al Qaeda?’ The problem of Sunni resistance is still there. The
Americans believe they can distinguish between good and bad insurgents, but
the Shia don’t share that distinction. For the Shia, they are all one

Nasr went on, “The United States is trying to fight on all sides—Sunni and
Shia—and be friends with all sides.” In the Shiite view, “It’s clear that
the United States cannot bring security to Iraq, because it is not doing
everything necessary to bring stability. If they did, they would talk to
anybody to achieve it—even Iran and Syria,” Nasr said. (Such engagement was
a major recommendation of the Iraq Study Group.) “America cannot bring
stability in Iraq by fighting Iran in Iraq.”

The revised bombing plan for a possible attack, with its tightened focus on
counterterrorism, is gathering support among generals and admirals in the
Pentagon. The strategy calls for the use of sea-launched cruise missiles
and more precisely targeted ground attacks and bombing strikes, including
plans to destroy the most important Revolutionary Guard training camps,
supply depots, and command and control facilities.

“Cheney’s option is now for a fast in and out—for surgical strikes,” the
former senior American intelligence official told me. The Joint Chiefs have
turned to the Navy, he said, which had been chafing over its role in the
Air Force-dominated air war in Iraq. “The Navy’s planes, ships, and cruise
missiles are in place in the Gulf and operating daily. They’ve got
everything they need—even AWACS are in place and the targets in Iran have
been programmed. The Navy is flying FA-18 missions every day in the Gulf.”
There are also plans to hit Iran’s anti-aircraft surface-to-air missile
sites. “We’ve got to get a path in and a path out,” the former official

A Pentagon consultant on counterterrorism told me that, if the bombing
campaign took place, it would be accompanied by a series of what he called
“short, sharp incursions” by American Special Forces units into suspected
Iranian training sites. He said, “Cheney is devoted to this, no question.”

A limited bombing attack of this sort “only makes sense if the intelligence
is good,” the consultant said. If the targets are not clearly defined, the
bombing “will start as limited, but then there will be an ‘escalation
special.’ Planners will say that we have to deal with Hezbollah here and
Syria there. The goal will be to hit the cue ball one time and have all the
balls go in the pocket. But add-ons are always there in strike planning.”

The surgical-strike plan has been shared with some of America’s allies, who
have had mixed reactions to it. Israel’s military and political leaders
were alarmed, believing, the consultant said, that it didn’t sufficiently
target Iran’s nuclear facilities. The White House has been reassuring the
Israeli government, the former senior official told me, that the more
limited target list would still serve the goal of counter-proliferation by
decapitating the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards, who are believed
to have direct control over the nuclear-research program. “Our theory is
that if we do the attacks as planned it will accomplish two things,” the
former senior official said.

An Israeli official said, “Our main focus has been the Iranian nuclear
facilities, not because other things aren’t important. We’ve worked on
missile technology and terrorism, but we see the Iranian nuclear issue as
one that cuts across everything.” Iran, he added, does not need to develop
an actual warhead to be a threat. “Our problems begin when they learn and
master the nuclear fuel cycle and when they have the nuclear materials,” he
said. There was, for example, the possibility of a “dirty bomb,” or of
Iran’s passing materials to terrorist groups. “There is still time for
diplomacy to have an impact, but not a lot,” the Israeli official said. “We
believe the technological timetable is moving faster than the diplomatic
timetable. And if diplomacy doesn’t work, as they say, all options are on
the table.”

The bombing plan has had its most positive reception from the newly elected
government of Britain’s Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. A senior European
official told me, “The British perception is that the Iranians are not
making the progress they want to see in their nuclear-enrichment
processing. All the intelligence community agree that Iran is providing
critical assistance, training, and technology to a surprising number of
terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, through Hezbollah, in
Lebanon, and Israel/Palestine, too.”

There were four possible responses to this Iranian activity, the European
official said: to do nothing (“There would be no retaliation to the
Iranians for their attacks; this would be sending the wrong signal”); to
publicize the Iranian actions (“There is one great difficulty with this
option—the widespread lack of faith in American intelligence assessments”);
to attack the Iranians operating inside Iraq (“We’ve been taking action
since last December, and it does have an effect”); or, finally, to attack
inside Iran.

The European official continued, “A major air strike against Iran could
well lead to a rallying around the flag there, but a very careful targeting
of terrorist training camps might not.” His view, he said, was that “once
the Iranians get a bloody nose they rethink things.” For example, Ali Akbar
Rafsanjani and Ali Larijani, two of Iran’s most influential political
figures, “might go to the Supreme Leader and say, ‘The hard-line policies
have got us into this mess. We must change our approach for the sake of the
regime.’ ”

A retired American four-star general with close ties to the British
military told me that there was another reason for Britain’s interest—shame
over the failure of the Royal Navy to protect the sailors and Royal Marines
who were seized by Iran on March 23rd, in the Persian Gulf. “The
professional guys are saying that British honor is at stake, and if there’s
another event like that in the water off Iran the British will hit back,”
he said.

The revised bombing plan “could work—if it’s in response to an Iranian
attack,” the retired four-star general said. “The British may want to do it
to get even, but the more reasonable people are saying, ‘Let’s do it if the
Iranians stage a cross-border attack inside Iraq.’ It’s got to be ten dead
American soldiers and four burned trucks.” There is, he added, “a
widespread belief in London that Tony Blair’s government was sold a bill of
goods by the White House in the buildup to the war against Iraq. So if
somebody comes into Gordon Brown’s office and says, ‘We have this
intelligence from America,’ Brown will ask, ‘Where did it come from? Have
we verified it?’ The burden of proof is high.”

The French government shares the Administration’s sense of urgency about
Iran’s nuclear program, and believes that Iran will be able to produce a
warhead within two years. France’s newly elected President, Nicolas
Sarkozy, created a stir in late August when he warned that Iran could be
attacked if it did not halt is nuclear program. Nonetheless, France has
indicated to the White House that it has doubts about a limited strike, the
former senior intelligence official told me. Many in the French government
have concluded that the Bush Administration has exaggerated the extent of
Iranian meddling inside Iraq; they believe, according to a European
diplomat, that “the American problems in Iraq are due to their own
mistakes, and now the Americans are trying to show some teeth. An American
bombing will show only that the Bush Administration has its own agenda
toward Iran.”

A European intelligence official made a similar point. “If you attack
Iran,” he told me, “and do not label it as being against Iran’s nuclear
facilities, it will strengthen the regime, and help to make the Islamic air
in the Middle East thicker.”

Ahmadinejad, in his speech at the United Nations, said that Iran considered
the dispute over its nuclear program “closed.” Iran would deal with it only
through the International Atomic Energy Agency, he said, and had decided to
“disregard unlawful and political impositions of the arrogant powers.” He
added, in a press conference after the speech, “the decisions of the United
States and France are not important.”

The director general of the I.A.E.A., Mohamed ElBaradei, has for years been
in an often bitter public dispute with the Bush Administration; the
agency’s most recent report found that Iran was far less proficient in
enriching uranium than expected. A diplomat in Vienna, where the I.A.E.A.
is based, said, “The Iranians are years away from making a bomb, as
ElBaradei has said all along. Running three thousand centrifuges does not
make a bomb.” The diplomat added, referring to hawks in the Bush
Administration, “They don’t like ElBaradei, because they are in a state of
denial. And now their negotiating policy has failed, and Iran is still
enriching uranium and still making progress.”

The diplomat expressed the bitterness that has marked the I.A.E.A.’s
dealings with the Bush Administration since the buildup to the 2003
invasion of Iraq. “The White House’s claims were all a pack of lies, and
Mohamed is dismissive of those lies,” the diplomat said.

Hans Blix, a former head of the I.A.E.A., questioned the Bush
Administration’s commitment to diplomacy. “There are important cards that
Washington could play; instead, they have three aircraft carriers sitting
in the Persian Gulf,” he said. Speaking of Iran’s role in Iraq, Blix added,
“My impression is that the United States has been trying to push up the
accusations against Iran as a basis for a possible attack—as an excuse for
jumping on them.”

The Iranian leadership is feeling the pressure. In the press conference
after his U.N. speech, Ahmadinejad was asked about a possible attack. “They
want to hurt us,” he said, “but, with the will of God, they won’t be able
to do it.” According to a former State Department adviser on Iran, the
Iranians complained, in diplomatic meetings in Baghdad with Ambassador
Crocker, about a refusal by the Bush Administration to take advantage of
their knowledge of the Iraqi political scene. The former adviser said,
“They’ve been trying to convey to the United States that ‘We can help you
in Iraq. Nobody knows Iraq better than us.’ ” Instead, the Iranians are
preparing for an American attack.

The adviser said that he had heard from a source in Iran that the
Revolutionary Guards have been telling religious leaders that they can
stand up to an American attack. “The Guards are claiming that they can
infiltrate American security,” the adviser said. “They are bragging that
they have spray-painted an American warship—to signal the Americans that
they can get close to them.” (I was told by the former senior intelligence
official that there was an unexplained incident, this spring, in which an
American warship was spray-painted with a bull’s-eye while docked in Qatar,
which may have been the source of the boasts.)

“Do you think those crazies in Tehran are going to say, ‘Uncle Sam is here!
We’d better stand down’? ” the former senior intelligence official said.
“The reality is an attack will make things ten times warmer.”

Another recent incident, in Afghanistan, reflects the tension over
intelligence. In July, the London Telegraph reported that what appeared to
be an SA-7 shoulder-launched missile was fired at an American C-130
Hercules aircraft. The missile missed its mark. Months earlier, British
commandos had intercepted a few truckloads of weapons, including one
containing a working SA-7 missile, coming across the Iranian border. But
there was no way of determining whether the missile fired at the C-130 had
come from Iran—especially since SA-7s are available through black-market
arms dealers.

Vincent Cannistraro, a retired C.I.A. officer who has worked closely with
his counterparts in Britain, added to the story: “The Brits told me that
they were afraid at first to tell us about the incident—in fear that Cheney
would use it as a reason to attack Iran.” The intelligence subsequently was
forwarded, he said.

The retired four-star general confirmed that British intelligence “was
worried” about passing the information along. “The Brits don’t trust the
Iranians,” the retired general said, “but they also don’t trust Bush and

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